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Although tobacco-control spending is considered an essential component of 
comprehensive programmes aimed at lowering smoking, substantial 
variation exists across states. This article examines if variation is 
systematically related to cross-state differences in smoking prevalence, 
holding other factors constant that are expected to influence spending. An 
econometric model is estimated which considers effects of tobacco-settlement 
revenues, income, unemployment, political party of the governor, state debt 
and smoking prevalence on tobacco-control spending in all states during 
2000--2007. Estimations control for the possibility that spending and 
smoking prevalence are co-determined to clearly determine the causal link 
from prevalence to spending. Spending variation is determined to be 
inconsistent with a 'rational needs' strategy whereby states with higher 
prevalence choose more funding than states with lower prevalence. This 
empirical result is consistent with recent studies indicating that spending on 
tobacco control exerts little to no effect on cigarette sales or smoking 
prevalence. 
1. Introduction 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2007) 
considers tobacco-control spending an essential com­1 
ponent of comprehensive programmes aimed at ow­
ering smoking. CDC only began publishing data on 
spending in 2000 because many states did not actively 
fund programmes until after the Master Settlement 
Agreement in 1998. Table 1 displays selected summary 
t . . ver($2005) 0s atlstlcs on annual per capita spending 
20_00-2007 published by Campaign for Tobacco-_Free
K d d th a 
t s (2008). The simple average is $2.99, an ~1 . 
range from $0.00 to $12.51, substantial vanatwn 
) h exists across states. Roughly, $5.3 billion ($2005 as 
been spent on tobacco control over this period. 
If variation is systematically related to factors th_at 
reflect urgency of public health concerns, ~uc_h as datf­
ferences in smoking prevalence, then vanatwn m Y 
simply represent efficient resource allocations across 
states. If spending is positively related to p~evalence, 
then spending variation suggests that fundmg flows 
. 
towards highest valued uses and is consistent with 
lowering prevalence within the natio~ as a whol~. 
However, an inverse relation may stgnal a pub_hc khealth problem because states with lower smo ·mg. 
1 th t tesprevalence allocate funds more generous y a~ s a . 
with higher prevalence. Lack of a?Y systemattc rela­
tionship may also signal a pubhc health probl~m 
because spending variation is unrelated to smo~mg 
prevalence and so funding does not flow towards htgh­
est valued uses. d1The issue of what determines tobacco-centro spc? ­
. . ect"ally important for the fundamental qucstton 
mgtsesp · ·r: tf h ther tobacco-control spending exerts a stgnlltc~m 
o w e . ette consumption. Hu eta/. (1995a, b) 
effect on ctgar d· 10 · found that California's tobacco-control spcn 10~ 
I980s significantly lowered consumptiOn.1 
the e~:e et a/. (2003) and Tauras et a/. (2~5) found 
Farr y d"ng significantly lowered smokmg from 
that sp~do in all 50 states. Other studies cast d~ubt 
1981 to ding effectivelv lowers consumptton. ~a~~~~~~~~;~xamined spending of all s
j
  
Table I. Annual per capita state spending ($2005) on tobacco control over 2000-2007 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
AK 5.92 6.11 2.44 8.61 MT 3.62 3.52 0.44 6.96 
AL 0.45 0.11 0.07 1.53 NC 0.91 1.05 0.00 1.79 
AR 5.50 6.37 0.00 6.97 ND 3.44 4.44 0.00 4.87 
AZ 4.98 4.01 3.48 7.30 NE 2.87 2.97 0.24 4.63 
CA 2.80 2.63 2.06 4.18 NH 1.30 1.24 0.00 2.74 
co 2.95 3.11 0.85 5.49 NJ 2.36 1.89 1.20 3.89 
CT 0.34 0.18 0.01 1.33 NM 2.58 2.79 1.39 3.7I 
DE 5.68 5.23 0.00 12.62 NV 1.84 1.87 1.4I 2.I9 
FL 1.35 1.12 0.05 3.II NY 2.30 2.12 1.73 4.20 
GA 1.56 1.76 0.23 2.63 OH 4.10 3.86 2.06 5.99 
HA 6.94 7.18 3.71 9.08 OK 1.56 1.68 0.53 2.62 
lA 2.49 1.95 1.73 3.64 OR 1.99 1.83 0.84 3.48 
ID 0.93 1.01 0.36 1.33 PA 2.64 3.1I 0.00 4.48 
IL 1.68 0.99 0.63 3.96 RI 2.40 2.44 0.85 3.36 
IN 3.87 3.69 1.63 6.51 sc 0.30 0.43 0.00 0.5I 
KS 
KY 
LA 
MA 
MD 
ME 
MI 
MN 
MO 
MS 
0.25 
0.98 
1.58 
3.36 
3.95 
12.51 
0.00 
5.59 
0.00 
7.51 
0.21 
0.71 
1.80 
1.01 
3.59 
11.52 
0.00 
5.20 
0.00 
7.28 
0.19 
0.49 
0.12 
0.40 
1.59 
10.46 
0.00 
3.66 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
1.62 
2.5I 
8.10 
6.40 
16.69 
0.00 
8.04 
0.00 
12.34 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VA 
VT 
WA 
WI 
wv 
WY 
1.82 
0.00 
0.42 
2.88 
2.I9 
9.12 
3.77 
2.75 
3.37 
5.99 
I.48 
0.00 
0.4I 
2.88 
2.0I 
8.37 
4.05 
2.44 
3.43 
6.27 
0.84 
0.00 
0.2I 
2.58 
1.62 
7.52 
2.76 
1.69 
2.83 
1.97 
3.85 
0.00 
0.62 
3.I3 
3.20 
I2.08 
4.55 
4.47 
3.70 
I1.15 
Source: Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2008). 
2001-2002 and found no significant effect on cigarette prevalence over 2001-2005 in the 50 states was found 
sales. Marlow (2007b) examined California's pro- in Marlow (2008). Marlow (2009) found no significant 
gramme over 1989-2002 and found a trivial effect on effect from spending on sales over 2000-2007 in all 50 
cigarette sales. No relation between spending and states. 
Table 2. Means (standard deviations) of variables (all states) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Spending 
TS 
UE 
INCOME 
DEMOCRAT 
DEBT 
PREVALENCE! 
PREY ALENCE2 
3.35 
(3.51) 
30.51 
(14.80) 
3.84 
(0.91) 
32 126 
(5 003) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
42.08 
(194.73) 
17.80 
(3.00) 
22.85 
(3.04) 
3.39 
(3.42) 
32.81 
(15.72) 
4.47 
(0.87) 
32 261 
(4 825) 
0.46 
(0.71) 
60.01 
(179.47) 
17.73 
(2.88) 
23.34 
(2.98) 
3.13 
(2.64) 
34.41 
(14.18) 
5.32 
( 1.00) 
32 171 
(4 654) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
157.42 
(218.08) 
I8.41 
(3.26) 
23.37 
(3.31) 
3.09 
(2.79) 
26.90 
(9.95) 
5.56 
(1.04) 
32 275 
(4 517) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
77.I2 
(233.42) 
I7.42 
(3.16) 
22.5I 
(3.34) 
2.73 
(2.89) 
26.52 
(7.95) 
5.14 
(0.99) 
33 067 
(4 722) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
55.64 
(251.56) 
I6.06 
(2.87) 
21.54 
(3.I9) 
2.70 
(2.73) 
26.19 
(7.96) 
4.88 
(1.06) 
33 453 
(4 900) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
I04.09 
(281.35) 
I5.64 
(2.82) 
21.02 
(3.I6) 
2.80 
(2.94) 
23.28 
(7.44) 
4.40 
(1.00) 
34 233 
(4 996) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
93.73 
(170.04) 
I5.20 
(2.90) 
20.35 
(3.I6) 
2.77 
(2.96) 
23.30 
(7.52) 
4.32 
(1.0 I) 
35 268 
(5 234) 
0.56 
(0.50) 
I60.8I 
(240.36) 
I4.98 
(2.98) 
20.09 
(3.19) 
Notes: Spending. tobacco-co_ntrol spending ($2005) per capita; TS, tobacco-settlement funds ($2005) per capita; UE, unemploy­
ment rate: Income. personal mc_ome ($2005) per capita; Democrat, I if governor is Democrat; 0 otherwise; Debt, I year change in 
total sta_te debt ($2005) per cap1ta; Prevalence I, per cent adult population who smoke 'every' day· Prevalence 2 per cent adult 
populatiOn who smoke 'every' day and 'some' days. ' ' 
Mixed evidence on whether spending significantly 
lowers tobacco use clearly indicates the importance of 
our study of the determinants of spending. This study 
examines the relation between smoking prevalence 
and spending over 2000-2007 across all 50 states, 
holding constant other factors that would be expected 
to influence spending. State spending is found to be 
inconsistent with a 'rational needs' strategy whereby 
states with greater public health concerns choose to 
fund programmes more generously than states with 
lesser problems. 
II. An Empirical Model of Spending 
Two studies have directly examined the determinants of 
state tobacco-control funding. Gross et al. (2002) stu­
died spending in 200 I and concluded that state health 
issues exert little effect on state spending. This study 
also found an inverse relationship between smoking 
rates and tobacco-control spending, but its use of sim­
ple correlation analysis and stepwise regression does 
not clearly indicate the causal direction of this relation­
ship. Marlow (2007a) examined state spending in 2001 
and 2002 and, although no systematic effects from a 
variety of factors were uncovered in 2001, significant 
influences were found for tobacco-settlement funds 
(positive), unemployment rates (negative) and budget 
deficits (positive) in 2002. No relationship betwe:n 
spending and smoking prevalence was uncovered. m 
either year. Examination of a longer time p:no? 
would thus appear to determine what relationship, tf 
any, exists between spending and smoking prevalence. 
The theory behind using tobacco-control pr?­
. d' ed mgrammes to lower smoking prevalence ts tscuss 
Marlow (2007a). As long as spending is believed to be 
· 1 eekinversely related to prevalence, and state o ffitcta s s 
to lower prevalence an efficient allocation across states 
would yield a posi;ive relation between spending and 
prevalence. States with higher smoking prevalence 
· h 1 er preva­receive greater funding than states wtt ow 
lence, holding constant other factors that influe~ce 
spending. Of course, this logic assumes that spendmg 
is equally effective in curbing prevalence acro~s s~ates 
. . 1·cy obtectives.and that states exhtbtt homogeneous po 1 • flJ 
Endogeneity is a concern if, while prevalence 1ll u­
. , · 1 needs' theory, ences spendmg under the ratwna 
. when states
spendmg may also influence preva 1ence . h 
exhibit different tolerances for smoking. States wtt 
h. t bacco controtgh tolerance then may spend less on ° 
1 
· ly becausethan states exhibiting low tolerance stmP f 
. . to be less o
states Wtth high tolerance vtew preva 1ence gh 
. e Althou1a problem than states wtth low to eranc · 
h. I ce a counter­tgher spending may cause lower preva en ' h. her 
· 1 causes tgmterpretation is that lower preva ence 
 
spending. Possibility of two-way causality between 
spending and prevalence is addressL'd by estimating 
models with and without two-stage least squares. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) produces biased and 
inconsistent estimates of coefficients when endog,cneity 
is a problem. If tolerance is an omitted variable. and 
tolerance is positively correlated with prevalence. then 
the OLS estimator of the prevalence coefficient will be 
biased upwards. 
The following model ofspending on tobacco control is 
estimated by a pooled regression model over 20<Xl-2007. 
Total sample size is 399 observations and includes all 
states except one observation (Hawaii) on prevalence in 
2004 that does not exist. Table 2 displays summary st~t­
tistics of the variables. All nominal dollar data arc con­
verted to $2005 by using the consumer price index: 
SPENDINGit =ftTSi" UEit. INCOME,,, (I) 
DEMOCRATi" DEBTi1, PREVALENCE,,) 
SPENDINGit refer to state per capita spending 
($2005) on tobacco-co~trol programmes and ~~as 
obtained from Campa1gn for Tobacco-Free. K1ds 
(2008). TSit are obtained from Orzec~owskl and 
Walker (2008) and refers to state per caplt:~ tobacco­
settlement funds ($2005) and arc hypothesized to. be 
positively related to spending based on expectation 
that some of these revenues fund tobacco contro~.. 
VEt are obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
d r~fer to unemployment rates and control for L'CO­
an · condition ofstates. Higher values are expected to 
nomtc ffi · 1 · dlower tobacco-control spending as o JCJa s raise spcn ­
. on income-stabilization progmmmes that then :~wds-out spending on tobacco control. Real ($2?05) 
er capita personal income, _INCOMEit· arc o~.tamcd 
p fL bor StatistiCS and are hypothesl7~d tofromBureauo a h .
'f 1 related to spending based on t c ~xpcct.l­
be post tveby control is a 'normal' good. Dl:BTi, arcf on that to acco . . 1I . from the Census Bureau and refer to -~car obtame~ overnment debt per capita ($2005) and 
changesmstateg t t'on that higher debt indicates 
control for the ex~~:a~ results in lower spending on 
greater fisca!r~~r~EMOCRATi, equals I if a state had 
tobacco con. . or and 0 otherwise to control for 
a Democr~t_JC govern ding priorities diiTer between 
the possibJhty that spen 
political parties. f he adult population who smoke. 
The per cent o ~ b d on data collected by the PREYALEN~Ei~> IS t ~s~urveillance System. a tcle­
Behavioral Rtsk F:eca~h behaviours of the civilian. 
phone survey o_f ulation. 18 years old and 
noninstitutionahzed US p 0 ~d red· PREYALENCE Iit 
es are cons1 e · 
over. Two measur f ·every' day smokers and 
measures per cent o es per cent of 'every' day
PREYALENCE2it measur 
  
plus 'sometimes' smokers. Expected signs on 
PREYALENCEit are positive under the 'rational needs' 
allocation framework whereby states with higher pre­
valence spend more than states with lesser needs. Both 
measures of prevalence are separately considered 
because it is unclear which measure is more important 
to policy makers. It is possible that prevalence influ­
ences spending with a lag when, for example budgets 
are based on the previous year's estimate of preva­
lence. However, when estimations of spending equa­
tions were run with 1-year lagged prevalence, results 
did not vary with those without lags, and so these 
alternative estimations are not displayed. 
To control for possible endogeneity between 
PREYALENCEit and SPENDINGit. an instrumental 
variable for PREYALENCEit is separately considered 
in two-stage least square regressions. Valid instruments 
are correlated with the prevalence variable, but not with 
the error term of the spending equation. Instruments 
include all the independent variables in Equation I 
except for PREYALENCEit plus a dichotomous vari­
able that equals I if the state has a significant tobacco­
manufacturing presence (Georgia, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia) and 0 
otherwise. Stock and Watson (2003) suggest that a 
simple rule of thumb to check for weak instruments: 
to demonstrate that the F-statistic exceeds 10 
when testing the hypothesis that coefficients on all 
instruments are zero. F-statistics of 31.3 (p < 0.001) 
for PREVALENCElit instruments, and of 28.6 
(p < 0.001) for PREVALENCE2it instruments, indi­
cates that these are not weak instruments. In regressions 
of PREVALENCE lit• the estimated coefficient on 
tobacco-manufacturing presence is 2.66 (t = 6.273, 
p < 0.001) and in regressions of PREVALENCE2·It 
the estimated coefficient on tobacco-manufacturing 
presence is 2.65 (t = 5.483, p < 0.001), and so 
prevalence is significantly higher in states with signifi­
cant tobacco industry presence. 
Ill. Results and Discussion 
OLS estimates are displayed in columns (1) and (3) of 
Table 3 and indicate significant influences from tobacco­
settlement funds (positive), unemployment (negative), 
income (negative), Democrat governor (positive), debt 
(negative) and both measures of prevalence (negative). 
Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimates in columns 
(2) and (4) indicate similar significant influences except 
unemployment which exerts no significant influence in 
column ( 4). OLS and TSLS estimates mirror each other 
except that, as noted below, coefficients on prevalence 
variables in TSLS estimations differ from OLS estima­
tions by a magnitude of roughly 3. 
States spend 11-13 cents ofeach dollar received from 
tobacco-settlement funds. States with Democratic gov­
ernors spend $1.21-$1.36 more than states with 
Republican governors. An extra dollar of debt lowers 
tobacco-control spending by only $0.001. Estimated 
coefficients on prevalence indicate that states do not 
follow a 'rational needs' approach to budgeting. OLS 
estimates indicate spending falls (rises) by 11-12 cents 
for every percentage point increase (decrease) in 
PREVALENCE1it and PREVALENCE2it (p = 0.021 
and p = 0.007, respectively). TSLS estimates indicate 
the same direction, but effects are roughly three times 
larger: spending falls (rises) by 34 cents for every per­
centage point in prevalence (p = 0.040 for both mea­
sures of prevalence). p-Values are lower in TSLS 
estimations and this commonly occurs because stan­
dard errors are biased downwards in OLS estimations 
when endogeneity is present. If tolerance is an omitted 
variable, and tolerance is positively correlated with 
prevalence, then the OLS estimator of the prevalence 
Table 3. Spending on tobacco control in all states-estimated coefficients (p-values) 
Explanatory variables 
(I) 
OLS 
(2) 
TSLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
TSLS 
TS 
UE 
INCOME 
DEMOCRAT 
DEBT 
PREY ALENCE I 
PREY ALENCE2 
0.099814 (<0.001) 
-0.377533 (0.003) 
-7.94E-05 (0.011) 
1.212395 (<0.001) 
-0.001105 (0.069) 
-0.1 I I 764 (0.021) 
0.112232 (<0.001) 
-0.297224 (0.034) 
-0.000142 (0.008) 
1.358667 (<0.001) 
-0.001304 (0.041) 
-0.338872 (0.040) 
0.100558 ( <0.00 1) 
-0.350944 (0.005) 
-8.14£-05 (0.008) 
1.214776 (<0.001) 
-0.001092 (0.071) 
0.112656 (<0.001) 
-0.234257 (0.130) 
-0.000139 (0.008) 
1.346031 ( <0.001) 
-0.001241 (0.049) 
Constant 
Observations 
F-statistic (p-value) 
R~ (adjusted) 
Mean dependent variable 
6.034649 (<0.001) 
399 
17.343 (<0.001) 
0.1977 
2.9828 
11.09931 (0.004) 
399 
17.161 (<0.001) 
0.1524 
2.9828 
-0.123417 (0.007) 
6.790722 (<0.001) 
399 
17.762 (<0.001) 
0.2018 
2.9828 
-0.341252 (0.039) 
12.524405 (0.006) 
399 
17.161 (<0.001) 
0.1549 
2.9828 
 coefficient will be biased upwards. These results are have lower prevalence because of spending pro­
therefore consistent with this concern and it is appro­ grammes. One way of dealing with this possibility is to 
priate to use TSLS estimation. exclude from analysis those states with long-st<mding 
Table 4 displays estimates from the 46 states that tobacco-control programmes based on the expectation 
participated in the tobacco-settlement agreement. that newer programmes are less eiTective in lowering 
Results mirror those of Table 3 with the following excep­ prevalence because eiTects are incremental in nature 
tions. Unemployment no longer exerts a significant influ­ and take many years to exert desired eiTects. Table 5 
ence in column (2). OLS estimates indicate that spending displays the estimates of tobacco-control spending 
falls (rises) by 13 cents for every percentage point increase excluding states with long-standing programmes ­
(decrease) in PREVALENCElit and PREVALENCE~t Arizona, California, Massachusetts and Oregon. 
(p = 0.008 and p = 0.005, respectively). Estimates from Whereas results mirror those of previous tables. it is 
TSLS again exhibit larger effects: spending falls (rises) by interesting that p-values associated with prevalence 
38 cents for every percentage point increase (decrease) in variables indicate that, while still negative and roughly 
PREVALENCElit and PREVALENCE2it (p = 0.021 of the same magnitudes, coefficients are less statistically 
and p = 0.031, respectively). These results are consis­ significant in TSLS estimations: PREYALENCE Iit 
tent with those of the previous table indicating that the (p = 0.072) and PREVALENCE2i1 (p == 0.071 ). 
These estimations suggest that the relationship betweenOLS estimator of the prevalence coefficient is biased 
spending and prevalence in states with newer tobacco­upwards and it is appropriate to use TSLS estimation. 
control programmes is either weakly negative or 1eroIt remains possible that the inverse relation between 
and therefore continue to alTer no support for thespending and prevalence is somehow related to the 
'rational needs' hypothesis.expectation that states spend more on tobacco control 
Table 4. Spending on tobacco control (46 states participating in tobacco settlement) estimated coefficient<; (p-ulurs) 
(4)(3)(2)(1) TSLSOLSTSLSExplanatory variables OLS 
0.129741 (<0.00))0.112845 ( <0.001) 0.129677 (<0.001)TS 0.112771 (<0.001) 
-0.127576 (0.437) 
-0.264853 (0.049)
-0.192736 (0.199)UE -0.287762 (0.031) -0.000148 (0.005)
-8.35E-05 (0.007)
-0.000153 (0.005)Income -8.48E-05 (0.007) 1.302695 (<0.001)1.144965 (<0.001)1.304760 (<0.001)Democrat 1.145188 (<0.001) -0.001435 (0.031)
-0.001251 (0.047)
-0.001545 (0.022)Debt -0.001288 (0.0412) 
-0.384757 (O.o21)Prevalence 1 -0.132756 (0.008) -0.383270 (C).(l31)
-0.133020 (0.005) 
12.99149 (0.004)Prevalence 2 6.526317 (<0.001)11.48684 (0.003)Constant 5.987083 (<0.001) 367367367 14.142 (<0.001)Observations 367 15.625 (<0.001)15.142 (<0.001) 0.1294F-statistic (p-value) 15.417 (<0.001) 0.1934 
R2 0.13414 3.0823(adjusted) 0.1912 3.082343.0823Mean dependent variable 3.0823 
(3)(2) OLS TSLS(1) TSLSExplanatory variables OLS 0.110258 (<0.001)0.100009 (<0.001)0.109306 (<0.001) -0.158972 (0.438)
TS 0.098987 (<0.001) -0.340877 (0.014)
-0.235538 (0.182) -0.000132 (0.01!11
-7.66E-05 (0.01 7)UE -0.376604 (0.006) 
-0 000138 (0.019) 1.477053 (<0.001)1.30449 I ( <0.00 I)Income -7.46E-05 (0.023) 1:501044 (<0.001) -0.001403 (0.CI43)
-0.001233 (0.061)Democrat 1.299073 (<0.001) 
-0.00!510(0.033)
Debt -0.001252 (0.058) 
-0.360019 (0.{171)
-0.358118 (0.071) 
-0.123229 (0.0 13)Prevalence 1 -0.105532 (0.045) 12.38132 (0.016)6.5 I9044 ( <0.00 I)Prevalence 2 11.06827 (0.013) 367 
Constant 5.707857 (<0.001) 367 16.744 (<0.001)367 17.335 (<0.001)Observations 367 16.744 (<0.00) 0.16060.2112F-statistic (p-value) 16.866 (<0.001) 0.1554 2.95672.9567R2 (adjusted) 0.2064 2.9567 
Mean dependent variable 2.9567 
  
IV. Conclusions 
Results do not support predictions of a 'rational 
needs' approach to funding. Holding constant other 
factors that influence spending, per capita annual 
spending ($2005) on tobacco control is found to fall 
(rise) by 34--38 cents for every percentage point 
increase (decrease) in prevalence. This inverse rela­
tionship arises in both estimations that do and do 
not correct for the possibility that states with less 
tolerance towards smoking will also spend more on 
tobacco control. These results suggest that spending 
variation across states does not reflect scarce funding 
dollars flowing towards highest valued uses. 
The empirical analysis also makes it difficult to argue 
that spending lowers prevalence, despite some studies 
concluding this causal flow. As discussed, more recent 
studies find little to no connection from spending on 
consumption or prevalence thus suggesting a reason 
connected to the main result of this article: funding 
does not systematically flow to those states with the 
highest smoking prevalence. Further research into 
these matters would appear to be in order. 
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